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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), 
the Supreme Court taught that criminal convictions based 
on jury instructions that equate reasonable doubt with 
substantial doubt and grave uncertainty may suggest a 
lower standard of proof than that required by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this state 
habeas corpus case arising under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, 
petitioner Nathaniel West claims that the jury charge in his 
Pennsylvania state court murder trial violated Cage, and 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue 
at trial and on appeal. This is West's second habeas corpus 
petition, his first having been filed before the Cage ruling. 
The District Court dismissed his latest filing for running 
afoul of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996), insofar as AEDPA mandates that a new rule of law 
can be the basis of a successive petition only if it has been 
"made retroactive to cases on collateral review" by the 
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2)(A). 
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West's appeal requires that we consider the meaning of 
AEDPA's retroactivity requirement. The District Attorney 
urges a restrictive reading, limiting the "made retroactive" 
exception to situations in which the Supreme Court has 
explicitly stated that a new rule of law is to be applied 
retroactively or has actually applied the rule in a retroactive 
manner. We conclude, however, that the statutory language 
is not so narrow. AEDPA's text does not restrict retroactive 
rules to those "held retroactive" or "applied retroactively" by 
the Supreme Court, but rather employs the more general 
term "made retroactive." At the time Congress enacted 
AEDPA, prevailing Supreme Court precedent "made 
retroactive" on habeas review new rules that implicated the 
fundamental fairness of a criminal proceeding and related 
to the accuracy of the underlying conviction, see, e.g., 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and we assume 
Congress to have been aware of this practice. The Supreme 
Court's declaration in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 
(1993), that a Cage error represents a "structural defect" 
that effectively nullifies the prior proceeding indicates that 
the Cage rule satisfies these fundamental fairness and 
accuracy requirements. 
 
In our view, even though Sullivan did not arise in the 
habeas context, it left no doubt as to how the Cage rule fits 
within retroactivity analysis. Indeed, prior to AEDPA's 
passage, several Courts of Appeals had found Cage 
available for retroactive application in habeas proceedings 
in light of Sullivan, largely obviating the Supreme Court's 
need to make a more explicit announcement (and rendering 
it less likely that there will ever be one). We believe that, in 
this setting, Teague retroactivity survives AEDPA's 
enactment, and we hold that the constitutional rule 
announced by Cage v. Louisiana has indeed been "made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review" within the meaning 
of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2)(A). 
 
Even though we rule that West's petition survives the 
gatekeeping hurdle that the new rule must have been 
"made retroactive," we conclude that West cannot obtain 
the relief he seeks, for he clearly cannot prevail on the 
merits of his claim. The jury instruction in his case did not 
differ significantly from language that has been previously 
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approved of by this Court and the Supreme Court. We will 
therefore affirm the District Court's dismissal of West's 
habeas petition.1 
 
I. 
 
On July 15, 1983, a jury of the Philadelphia County 
Court of Common Pleas convicted petitioner West offirst- 
degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an 
instrument of crime. Prior to its deliberations, the jury 
received the following instruction on reasonable doubt from 
the trial judge, the Honorable Lisa Aversa Richette: 
 
        Now, I just want to say that we have heard these 
       words a great deal, the reasonable doubt phrase, and 
       I think that all three lawyers did talk about reasonable 
       doubt in a very intelligent and correct way. I think one 
       of them, Mr. Voluck, even gave an example that I 
       usually give, that one about going to look at a house 
       and as you have seen all the specs on the house, it 
       sounds magnificent, new copper tubing and all the 
       rest. And as you are coming out of the house, you 
       notice a very large stain on one wall which indicates 
       some major kind of internal leak. You don't go racing 
       back to the real estate office with a hefty down 
       payment. You pause and you hesitate because this is 
       a matter of high importance to yourself. You know, 
       buying a house is probably the largest single 
       expenditure most of us make in our lifetime short of, 
       God forbid, if we ever have incapacitating medical bills 
       without medical insurance. But that's what you would 
       do, you would pause and you would hesitate. And 
       there are matters of high importance to all of us in our 
       lives in which in evaluating the evidence that we are 
       using to make that decision, we come up with the kind 
       and quality of evidence that makes us pause and 
       hesitate before we make a decision. Now, it is this kind 
       of doubt that we are talking about in this case, in all 
       criminal cases, the kind of substantial doubt that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We express our appreciation to Anthony C.H. Vale, Esquire, who, 
pursuant to appointment by the court, represented Mr. West both ably 
and zealously. 
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       makes people pause before they plunge into action that 
       is going to involve some important interests on their 
       part. 
 
        So think about the evidence completely. Do you have 
       that kind of doubt about the defendants' guilt? 
 
        . . . . 
 
        What I was saying was that if you don't have this 
       kind of doubt, then it is your duty to convict. Now, this 
       doesn't mean to say that you should have no doubt, 
       that you should be persuaded beyond all doubt 
       because that is not Mr. McGill's burden. We said that 
       earlier that there is -- there are almost no areas of 
       human affairs in which there are no doubts. There is 
       always a little edge of doubt somewhere. So we are not 
       asking Mr. McGill to prove this case to you beyond a 
       mathematical certainty, like an algebra or a calculus 
       problem. What we are asking is that it be proved to you 
       by the District Attorney beyond a reasonable doubt so 
       that you don't have the kind of doubt that comes up in 
       human affairs which makes a person pause and 
       hesitate. 
 
        Now, this doubt, of course, has to arise from the 
       evidence, not from your own suspicions or your own 
       speculations or your own predispositions, but after 
       considering the evidence if you have this doubt, then I 
       say you have a duty to acquit. 
 
App. 119-21 (emphasis added). 
 
West received a life sentence. After exhausting his direct 
appeals in the Pennsylvania state courts, which resulted in 
the vacatur of his judgment of sentence as to his conviction 
for possessing an instrument of crime but left his other 
sentences undisturbed, he filed a federal habeas corpus 
petition that was denied on the merits on July 12, 1990, 
four months before the Supreme Court decided Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990). 
 
Cage held that jury instructions that equated reasonable 
doubt with "actual substantial doubt" and "grave 
uncertainty" in conjunction with language calling for "moral 
certainty" suggested a higher degree of doubt than allowed 
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by the reasonable doubt standard.2 As a result, such 
instructions have the potential of allowing a conviction 
based on proof below the minimum required by the Due 
Process Clause. See id. at 41. Thereafter, in Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the Court declared that 
harmless error analysis does not apply to an instruction 
that does not meet the rule articulated in Cage.3 
 
On May 10, 1991, West filed a petition under 
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. 
C.S. S 9541 et seq. He alleged ineffectiveness of counsel at 
both the trial and appellate levels on the grounds that his 
attorneys failed to object to a jury charge that allegedly 
misdefined "reasonable doubt" as "substantial doubt." The 
trial court denied his petition on March 8, 1994, and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the ruling the 
following year.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The instruction in Cage provided: 
 
       If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element 
       necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to 
give 
       him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. 
Even 
       where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does 
not 
       establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the 
       accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one 
       that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon 
       mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give 
       rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the 
       unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A 
       reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual 
       substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can 
seriously 
 
       entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical 
       certainty, but a moral certainty. 
 
Id. at 40 (emphasis in the original). 
3. The standard for reviewing jury instructions for a Cage error is 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the 
instruction in an unconstitutional manner. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62, 72 & n.4 (1991). In making this evaluation, a reviewing court is 
to consider the instructions as a whole. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 
1, 5 (1994). 
 
4. West further contended that his attorneys failed to object to a faulty 
jury charge on the presumption of innocence. This claim was rejected. 
He raised this claim in his second pleaded habeas petition, but the 
District Court rejected it because West failed to present an argument 
that the issue involved either a new rule of constitutional law or new 
evidence and was therefore barred by 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(2). That ruling 
is not before us today. 
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West filed his second petition for federal habeas relief on 
April 1, 1997, raising the same issues as his PCRA petition, 
and arguing that the jury instructions he received violated 
Cage. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(C), a panel of this 
Court, after determining that West had made a prima facie 
showing that he met the requirements of S 2244(b)(2)(A), 
granted him permission to file a second claim on June 23, 
1997. In so doing, the panel construed West's filing as 
requesting permission to file both due process and 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
 
In their argument before the magistrate judge to whom 
the case was assigned, the state appellees maintained that, 
notwithstanding our finding that West met the prima facie 
showing required to file a successive petition under S 2244, 
his petition was still barred by his failure to satisfy the 
terms of S 2244(b)(2). The magistrate judge agreed. He 
recommended that West's petition be dismissed with 
prejudice because West had failed to establish that Cage 
has been "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court" as required by S 2244(b)(2)(A). The 
District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed 
the petition with prejudice on July 28, 1998. We granted an 
application for a Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(2) and directed the parties to brief the issue of 
whether Cage has been "made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court" as required by 
S 2244(b)(2). 
 
Our jurisdiction over this appeal from a final judgment of 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
stems from 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 28 U.S.C.S 2253. The 
District Court had jurisdiction over West's petition under 
28 U.S.C. S 2254 and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. Our review of the 
District Court's interpretation of AEDPA is plenary. See 
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 
II. 
 
AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b) to declare in 
pertinent part: 
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        (2) A claim presented in a second or successive 
       habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was 
       not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 
       unless-- 
 
        (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a 
       new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
       cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 
       was previously unavailable; or 
 
        (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not 
       have been discovered previously through the exercise of 
       due diligence; and 
 
        (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and 
       viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be 
       sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
       that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
       factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
       underlying offense. 
 
West does not offer any newly discovered or innocence- 
establishing facts, so our decision depends on 
S 2244(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, we turn to the question on 
which we directed briefing: whether the Supreme Court has 
made the rule of Cage v. Louisiana retroactive for purposes 
of collateral review. 
 
A. 
 
Were the Supreme Court to state explicitly that Cage is 
retroactive on collateral review or retroactively apply Cage, 
the issue would be resolved. West contends that the Court 
has already retroactively applied Cage in Adams v. Evatt, 
511 U.S. 1001 (1994), a pre-AEDPA case. There, in 
considering a habeas petition, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that Cage should not be applied 
retroactively. See Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1312 
(4th Cir. 1992) ("Adams I"). In Adams v. Evatt ("Adams II"), 
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment with directions 
that the Court of Appeals reconsider the case in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision Sullivan v. Louisiana . See 511 
U.S. 1001. On remand, the Court of Appeals altered its 
original conclusion and determined that Cage is available 
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for retroactive application. See Adams v. Aiken , 41 F.3d 
175, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Adams III"). 
 
West claims that the Supreme Court's granting of 
certiorari, vacatur of the appellate court's judgment, and 
remand to the Court of Appeals (a "GVR" order), effectively 
made Cage retroactive on collateral review, a conclusion 
buttressed by the Court of Appeals's changed decision after 
the GVR order. We need not tarry long over this argument. 
The Supreme Court has made clear that, though remand 
may indicate that intervening precedent is sufficiently 
analogous or decisive to compel re-examination, it is not a 
"final determination on the merits." Henry v. City of Rock 
Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964). More recently, the Court has 
stated that, although GVR orders may be issued in 
situations where redetermination in light of intervening 
developments may decide the merits of a case, they require 
only "consideration" by the lower court and are not 
summary reversals. See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 
167-68 (1996); see also Fontroy v. Owens, 23 F.3d 63, 66 
(3d Cir. 1994); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 
F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Vacatur and remand by 
the Supreme Court, however, does not create an 
implication that the lower court should change its prior 
determination."). 
 
In his reply brief, West concedes that "[i]n form, a GVR 
order may never be a final decision on the merits," but 
contends that "in substance, it sometimes is." Reply Br. at 
2. We decline to engage in the parsing of Supreme Court 
intent necessary to breathe life into so abstract a 
contention. Whatever a GVR's order value as a predictor of 
the Court's position on a particular matter, we do not treat 
such an order as a dispositive ruling. See Rodriguez v. 
Superintendent, Bay State Correctional Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 
276 (1st Cir. 1998). Other than his attempt to rely on 
Adams, West offers no Supreme Court precedent that he 
claims explicitly states that the Cage rule is to be applied 
retroactively for purposes of S 2244 or applies the rule in 
such a manner. We are similarly unaware of such 
precedent. 
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B. 
 
In determining which new rules of law are retroactive 
under AEDPA, we are, of course, bound by the statute's 
plain meaning. See Wilson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 
193 F.3d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We must give the 
natural and customary meaning to the words, and if that is 
plain, our sole function is to enforce it according to its 
terms." (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 
(1917))). Unfortunately, as the Supreme Court itself has 
recognized, AEDPA is less than a masterpiece of clarity. See 
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("All we can say 
is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the Act is 
not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."). 
 
1. 
 
The plain meaning argument against Cage retroactivity is 
simply stated: If the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
applied the rule retroactively or stated that the rule so 
applies, a successive habeas corpus petition based on Cage 
is unavailable because Cage has not been"made 
retroactive." Several of our sister circuits have already 
employed this logic to exclude successive petitions based on 
Cage. See In re Smith, 142 F.3d 832, 835-36 (5th Cir. 
1998); Rodriguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Correctional 
Ctr., 139 F.3d 270 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181 
(11th Cir. 1997), or other "new" rules for which petitioners 
sought retroactive application, see Bennett v. United States, 
119 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 
We do not, however, share the view of these courts of 
appeals that Congress's directive is so clear. More 
specifically, we are not convinced that "made retroactive" 
deserves the restrictive gloss applied by these courts in 
construing the term. Although "made retroactive" obviously 
encompasses direct retroactive application of a rule by the 
Supreme Court or express statements to that effect, we 
doubt that those meanings exhaust the phrase. Had 
Congress intended to cabin AEDPA retroactivity in that 
manner, it could have employed more specific terminology. 
Terms such as "held retroactive" or "applied retroactively" 
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would have left no doubt as to Cage's retroactivity. Instead, 
Congress chose the broader verb "made," which includes 
among its many meanings to have "cause[d] to occur" and 
"cause[d] to be or become: put in a certain state or 
condition." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
1363 (1966). A natural question, therefore, is whether there 
are alternative methods through which the Supreme Court 
could cause a rule to become retroactive. 
 
Such an alternative existed when Congress passed 
AEDPA, through the framework created by Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague established that federal courts 
may retroactively apply new rules of law on habeas 
petitions if the rules are "watershed rules of criminal 
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and 
accuracy of the criminal proceeding," Graham v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (internal quotations omitted), that 
"alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements 
essential to the fairness of a proceeding."5 Sawyer v. Smith, 
497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal quotations omitted) 
(emphasis in the original); see also Bousley v. United 
States, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) ("[U]nless a new rule 
of criminal procedure is of such a nature that `without [it] 
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously 
diminished, there is no reason to apply the rule 
retroactively on habeas review.' " (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. 
at 313)).6 
 
In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the 
Supreme Court made clear that the Cage rule involves 
procedural elements essential to the fundamental fairness 
and accuracy of a criminal proceeding. Sullivan declared 
that harmless error analysis does not apply to an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although Teague was a plurality opinion, the Teague rule has been 
applied in subsequent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., O'Dell v. 
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 157 (1997). 
 
6. There does not appear to be significant dispute over whether the Cage 
rule was indeed "new" law. See Rodriguez , 139 F.3d at 273-74 ("A string 
of federal appellate decisions have held that Cage announced a new rule 
of constitutional law, see, e.g., Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 178-79 (4th 
Cir. 1994) (Adams III); Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 
1994); Skelton v. Whitley, 950 F.2d 1037, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1992), and 
we see no principled basis for sundering this unbroken strand."). 
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instruction that was "essentially identical" to the one 
present in Cage. Id. at 277, 281. In so ruling, the Court 
classified denial of a right to a jury verdict beyond a 
reasonable doubt as a "structural defect" "without which a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function."7 Id. at 281. 
Harmless error analysis cannot apply to a jury instruction 
that violates Cage because the error is so fundamental that, 
effectively, there is no verdict for an appellate court to 
review. See id. at 280.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The list of errors that are structural in quality is a limited one. 
 
       [W]e have found an error to be "structural," and thus subject to 
       automatic reversal, only in a "very limited class of cases." 
Johnson 
 
       v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 
       718 (1997) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 
792, 
 
       9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (complete denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 
       273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (biased trial 
judge); 
       Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 
       (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); McKaskle 
v. 
       Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (denial 
       of self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 
104 
       S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (denial of public trial); Sullivan 
v. 
       Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) 
       (defective reasonable-doubt instruction)). 
 
Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1999). 
 
8. In discussing why the harmless error standard of Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), could not apply, the Court explained: 
 
        Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which 
       "the jury actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other 
words, 
is 
       not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
       verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty 
       verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable 
to 
 
       the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict 
       that was never in fact rendered--no matter how inescapable the 
       findings to support that verdict might be--would violate the jury- 
       trial guarantee. 
 
        Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the 
       Chapman inquiry is understood, the illogic of harmless-error review 
       in the present case becomes evident. Since, for the reasons 
       described above, there has been no jury verdict within the meaning 
       of the Sixth Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is 
       simply absent. There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a- 
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Sullivan had a significant effect on the reception and 
interpretation of Cage for retroactivity purposes. Prior to 
Sullivan, several Courts of Appeals refused to apply Cage 
retroactively. See Adams I, supra; Skelton v. Whitley, 950 
F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1992). Since then, however, 
the decisions have been monolithically in favor of 
retroactivity. See Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 
1998) (en banc); Adams III, 41 F.3d at 179 ("[T]he rule that 
a constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction 
violates the Due Process Clause satisfies Teague's second 
exception. It should be applied retroactively."); Nutter v. 
White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[H]ere we 
confront one of those rare instances where our interest in 
certainty is so clearly implicated that finality interests must 
be subordinated. In sum, together with Sullivan, Cage has 
reshaped our view of the importance of precise reasonable 
doubt instructions."). 
 
Though this Court has, until now, reserved the issue, see 
Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736, 756 n.25 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc), it seems clear that, were we operating in the pre- 
AEDPA context, we would recognize Sullivan as compelling 
retroactive application of Cage to habeas petitions. A 
"structural" error so severe that it resists harmless error 
analysis because it effectively nullifies the guilty verdict, as 
Sullivan described a Cage error to be, see 508 U.S. at 279- 
80, must necessarily implicate the fundamental fairness of 
the proceeding in a manner that calls the accuracy of its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty- 
       beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the 
       constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so 
to 
       speak, upon which harmless-error scrutiny can operate. The most 
       an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have 
       found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt--not that the 
       jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would 
       surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. 
That 
 
       is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
       speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed 
       verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires 
an 
       actual jury finding of guilty. 
 
Id. at 279-80 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
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outcome into doubt.9 See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 
467 (1993); see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 285 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring) ("A constitutionally deficient reasonable 
doubt instruction will always result in the absence of 
`beyond a reasonable doubt' jury findings."). 
 
2. 
 
We must, however, decide if AEDPA eliminates traditional 
Teague retroactivity analysis for pre-AEDPA decisions by 
the Supreme Court. We conclude that precedent that 
makes clear that a new constitutional rule fits the Teague 
retroactivity exception suffices to make a rule retroactive for 
purposes of successive habeas petitions under AEDPA. This 
is so even if the pronouncements are not made in the 
context of an actual retroactive application of the new rule 
on habeas review. 
 
In so doing, we assume that when Congress passed 
AEDPA, it was aware of then-current practices in the courts 
vis-a-vis retroactivity. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) ("It is always appropriate to 
assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, 
know the law."); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 235 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. As a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained in 
Humphrey v. Cain, 120 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1997) in the context of 
allowing retroactive application of Cage on a first petition of habeas 
corpus: 
 
        In our view, the Supreme Court has made it plain that Cage-Victor 
       errors fit with the second Teague exception. The Court in Sullivan 
v. 
       Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), 
       explained that denying the right to a jury verdict beyond a 
       reasonable doubt is a structural defect. Such an error takes away a 
       " `basic protectio[n]' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but 
       without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function." 
Id. 
       at 281, 113 S.Ct. at 2083. In other words, a jury that purports to 
       convict based on a constitutionally defective reasonable-doubt 
       instruction has in fact not rendered any conviction at all. 
 
The panel was unable to apply Cage retroactively because of prior 
precedent, but its discussion of the issue was the basis of the en banc 
court's decision to make Cage retroactive for Teague purposes. See 
Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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Cir. 1999) (declaring Congress aware of relevant court 
precedents in enacting AEDPA). At the time of AEDPA's 
passage, Congress knew that new constitutional rules were 
retroactively applicable to habeas petitions if the Supreme 
Court declared them to be of a certain quality. Congress did 
not explicitly alter this mechanism and chose language 
consistent with then-contemporary practice instead of a 
more restrictive formulation.10 We are therefore satisfied 
that the language in Sullivan v. Louisiana that describes the 
violation in Cage as structural suffices to establish Cage's 
retroactivity. 
 
Our reasoning is bolstered by the fact that Sullivan's 
clarity obviated the need for the Supreme Court to make a 
future, more explicit, pronouncement on whether Cage 
should be applied retroactively. In practical terms, Sullivan 
choked off the flow of cases in which an explicit 
pronouncement might be necessary. As federal courts 
follow the Supreme Court's lead, see, e.g., Adams III, 41 
F.3d at 178-79; Nutter, 39 F.3d at 1158, there will be no 
reason to make matters explicit, as the issue will not reach 
the Supreme Court on appeal when retroactivity was 
obvious. Adams II appears the rare case in which the Court 
had a chance to address the issue, but it remanded in light 
of the relative freshness of Sullivan to give the court of 
appeals an opportunity to pass on the issue itself. Though 
the GVR order in Adams II is not a retroactive application 
of Cage, see supra Part II.A, it is quite persuasive on the 
question of Sullivan's applicability to the Cage retroactivity 
issue notwithstanding the fact that Sullivan arose on a 
direct appeal. 
 
We acknowledge that other courts have taken a different 
view on retroactivity under AEDPA. See, e.g., In re Vial, 115 
F.3d 1192 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). In Vial, the court ruled 
that for purposes of a S 2255 motion, which has the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Of course, Congress did indeed narrow the range of retroactive 
constitutional rules by restricting the range of new rules to those made 
retroactive by the Supreme Court in particular and not federal courts in 
general. The question is not whether only the Supreme Court can make 
a new rule retroactive, but how that retroactivity is expressed. We find 
no indication that AEDPA eliminated the role of the lower federal courts 
in interpreting the effect of Supreme Court pronouncements. 
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statutory retroactivity standard as a S 2244 motion, "we 
conclude that a new rule of constitutional law has been 
`made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court' within the meaning of S 2255 only when 
the Supreme Court declares the collateral availability of the 
rule in question, either by explicitly so stating or by 
applying the rule in a collateral proceeding." Id. at 1197. 
The court refused to interpret "made retroactive" as 
encompassing situations in which Supreme Court 
precedent establishes "that the new rule is of the type 
available to those proceeding on collateral review," because 
it viewed such an approach as contrary to the plain 
language of S 2255. Id. at 1196. 
 
As discussed above, we differ on what a plain language 
approach compels in this case. We note also that the 
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that, prior to AEDPA, the 
Supreme Court had no reason to be more explicit in its 
pronouncements on retroactivity. "Of course, it seems 
unlikely that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to 
declare the applicability of a rule announced on direct 
review to collateral proceedings when . . . lower federal 
courts uniformly rule in favor of collateral availability." Id. 
at 1196 n.8. A consequence of the Fourth Circuit approach, 
therefore, would be to preclude habeas review for claims 
most clearly deserving of retroactive application. In the 
absence of more specific language, we do not think this was 
Congress's intention in passing AEDPA. 
 
For all of these reasons, we hold that Cage claims have 
been "made retroactive" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(b)(2)(A). 
 
III. 
 
In holding that Cage claims are available for retroactive 
application under AEDPA, we do not rule that West is 
entitled to the relief he seeks. Several issues stand between 
West and a favorable judgment on the merits. First, though 
West's initial petition for habeas relief raised only issues of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a panel of this Court 
construed West's request as including both ineffective 
assistance and due process claims. The question remains 
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whether a due process claim has met exhaustion 
requirements and whether it has been procedurally 
defaulted. Another potential issue is whether the claim was 
"previously unavailable" for purposes of AEDPA, see 
S 2244(b)(2)(A), or if West still should have raised his due 
process claims in earlier proceedings notwithstanding the 
fact that the Supreme Court had as yet not announced the 
Cage rule.11 
 
We might determine these issues in the first instance or 
remand them to the District Court. Alternatively, we may 
exercise our ability to dispose of habeas cases adversely to 
a petitioner regardless of considerations of exhaustion if the 
merits are clearly against the petitioner. See  28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(2); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987). 
Such a disposition appears in order here, as West cannot 
prevail under either an ineffective assistance or a due 
process claim regardless of the resolution of the procedural 
issues. Whatever the soundness of the procedural 
foundation of his habeas petition, it is fatally weak at its 
substantive core, for there was simply no constitutional 
defect at West's trial. 
 
The portion of the jury instruction at issue in this case 
does not appear to differ significantly from an instruction 
that we approved in Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 736 (3d 
Cir. 1995). In Flamer, this Court, sitting en banc, held that 
refusing, on grounds of procedural default, to review a jury 
instruction that contained a sentence equating substantial 
doubt and reasonable doubt would not constitute a 
miscarriage of justice because the instruction was similar 
to one approved of by the Supreme Court. The challenged 
instruction stated: 
 
       Reasonable doubt does not mean a vague, speculative 
       or whimsical doubt, nor a mere possible doubt, but a 
       substantial doubt and such a doubt as intelligent, 
       reasonable and impartial men and women may 
       honestly entertain after a careful and conscientious 
       consideration of the evidence in the case. 
 
Id. at 757 (emphasis in original). We stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The state appellees do not raise this issue. 
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notwithstanding the equation of substantial doubt to a 
reasonable doubt, the instruction "contrasted a`substantial 
doubt' with `a doubt arising from a mere possible doubt,' `a 
vague, speculative' doubt, and a `whimsical doubt.' " Id. at 
757. Similar use of the term "substantial doubt" was 
approved by the Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 
U.S. 1 (1994). 
 
Addressing this issue at oral argument, West's counsel 
offered arguments seeking to distinguish the instructions at 
issue here from those in Flamer by noting that the 
instructions by the trial judge did not similarly contrast 
substantial doubt with a merely speculative or fanciful 
doubt, thereby leaving the implication that the term 
"substantial" was used in the sense of connoting a large 
amount, rather than the acceptable "not imaginary." We are 
unpersuaded. We bear in mind that jury instructions are to 
be considered as a whole. "[T]he Constitution does not 
require that any particular form of words be used in 
advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. 
Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly 
conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (citations and quotations omitted). 
West's instructions went beyond the statement concerning 
substantial doubt and further defined the term "reasonable 
doubt:" 
 
       Now, it is this kind of doubt that we are talking about 
       in this case, in all criminal cases, the kind of 
       substantial doubt that makes people pause before they 
       plunge into action that is going to involve some 
       important interests on their part. 
 
       . . . 
 
       What we are asking is that it be proved to you by the 
       District Attorney beyond a reasonable doubt so that 
       you don't have the kind of doubt that comes up in 
       human affairs which makes a person pause and 
       hesitate. 
 
App. 119-21 (emphasis added). 
 
In Victor, the Supreme Court stated that even though the 
instruction at issue was not a constitutional violation 
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because it contrasted substantial doubt with a fanciful 
conjecture, "[i]n any event, the instruction provided an 
alternative definition of reasonable doubt: a doubt that 
would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act. This is 
a formulation we have repeatedly approved." Victor, 511 
U.S. at 20.12 The Court concluded that such an instruction 
is not likely to mislead a jury. "[T]o the extent the word 
`substantial' denotes the quantum of doubt necessary for 
acquittal, the hesitate to act standard gives a common 
sense benchmark for just how substantial such a doubt 
must be." Id. at 20-21. It is clear that that is precisely what 
the jury instruction in West's case did. Therefore, although 
a sentence that appears to equate reasonable doubt and 
substantial doubt is problematic, see id. at 19, such a 
statement used one time in an otherwise unobjectionable 
charge does not render the instruction constitutionally 
suspect as a whole.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The instruction at issue in Victor was as follows: 
 
       "Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable 
       and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important 
       transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the 
       represented facts as true and relying and acting thereon. It is 
such 
 
       a doubt as will not permit you, after full, fair, and impartial 
       consideration of all the evidence, to have an abiding conviction, 
to 
a 
       moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At the same time, 
       absolute or mathematical certainty is not required. You may be 
       convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet 
       be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an 
       accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided 
       such probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his 
       guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual and 
       substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence, from the 
       facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of 
       evidence on the part of the State, as distinguished from a doubt 
       arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from 
fanciful 
       conjecture. 
 
Id. at 18 (emphasis in the original). 
 
13. In his argument before the District Court, West also maintained that 
the trial judge's example of a stain indicating"some major kind of leak" 
in a house that prompted hesitation in a buyer also served to dilute the 
reasonable doubt standard. The state appellees claim that West failed to 
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properly raise the issue in state proceedings. We think it clear, however, 
that the hypothetical in the jury instruction was drawn to give context 
to the court's explanation of what the meaning of hesitation to act is, 
and that the word "major" was not equated to "major doubt" or the like. 
In this context, the instruction was unobjectionable. 
We therefore conclude that West is unable to prevail on 
the merits. Accordingly, we decline to consider the other, 
unresolved, issues that could potentially preclude review of 
his Cage claim. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's order dismissing West's habeas petition. 
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